Weekly Quotes
15th January
. . .'anything goes' does not express any conviction of mine, it is jocular summary of the predicament of the rationalist: if you want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live without principles that hold independently of situation, shape of world, exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, ties, then I can give you such a 'principle.' It will be empty, useless, and pretty ridiculous - but it will be a 'principle.' It will be the 'principle' 'anything goes.'
. . .'anything goes' does not express any conviction of mine, it is jocular summary of the predicament of the rationalist: if you want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live without principles that hold independently of situation, shape of world, exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, ties, then I can give you such a 'principle.' It will be empty, useless, and pretty ridiculous - but it will be a 'principle.' It will be the 'principle' 'anything goes.'
Science in a Free Society, London: Verso, 1978. p.188.
Quote selected by Horst Treiblmaier.
There is no rule that is valid under all circumstances just as there is no measuring instrument that measure everything and in all circumstances, but it is possible to construct such a rule in a purely formal manner: it is the rule 'anything goes'. Does this mean that there will not be a theory of knowledge? Not at all. There will be lots of rules of thumb with practical advice about their limits and their judicious application inside the limits, but there will not be any general principles. The theory of knowledge I envisage has therefore much in common with the science of rhetoric; it has very little in common with the science of logic, in its present shape. All this means, of course, is that methodology is taken out of the hands of armchair philosphers and logicians and given back to the researchers themselves. It is they who advance into the unknown, it is they who must decide which (physical or mental) instruments to choose.
There is no rule that is valid under all circumstances just as there is no measuring instrument that measure everything and in all circumstances, but it is possible to construct such a rule in a purely formal manner: it is the rule 'anything goes'. Does this mean that there will not be a theory of knowledge? Not at all. There will be lots of rules of thumb with practical advice about their limits and their judicious application inside the limits, but there will not be any general principles. The theory of knowledge I envisage has therefore much in common with the science of rhetoric; it has very little in common with the science of logic, in its present shape. All this means, of course, is that methodology is taken out of the hands of armchair philosphers and logicians and given back to the researchers themselves. It is they who advance into the unknown, it is they who must decide which (physical or mental) instruments to choose.
"Logic, literacy and professor Gellner", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27(1976) No.4. p.388.